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TRUST, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, AND LESSONS FROM FIDUCIARY
LAW
Lisa M. Fairfax'
Legal commentators, judges, and scholars seem to agree on the social
and economic importance of trust and relationships of trust to our
society. Recently, a small but distinct group of scholars has emphasized
the virtues of trust in a democratic society! Among them, Francis
Fukuyama argues that social trust and relationships of trust facilitate
economic development.2 In addition, Robert Putnam refers to the trust
among certain organizations as "social capital" and argues that trust in
the form of social capital is instrumental to the well-being of society.' In
this same vein, James Coleman argues that group members who trust one
another increase their productivity and can achieve goals unattainable by
those lacking trust.4 This collective recognition of the importance of trust
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1. See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
2. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY 8 (1995).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 167-71 (1993); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995) (explaining that the
"social trust" developed through the civic engagements known as social capital
"pervasively influence our public life, as well as our private prospects"). Glenn Loury has
been credited for introducing the concept of social capital. See PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK, supra at 241 n.20; JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 300-21 (1990). Putnam defines social capital as "features of social organization,
such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions." PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra at 164. According
to Putnam, social capital is critical to the success of organizations because "[i]f actors are
unable to make credible commitments to one another, they must forego many
opportunities for mutual gain-ruefully, but rationally." Id. at 167. Putnam additionally
explains that trust is an essential component of social capital. Id. at 170. "Trust lubricates
cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood
of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust." Id. at 171.
4. See COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 304. Coleman notes that "a group whose
members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to
accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust."
Id.
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is not a novel concept; instead, such a recognition has been an integral
aspect of the American legal landscape for centuries.5 Most notably, by
imposing special duties on participants in special trust relationships, the
law of fiduciary obligations "permit[s] and encourage[s] the reposing of
trust.
' 6
Legal commentators, judges, and scholars also appear to agree on the
appropriateness of imposing more stringent obligations on those within a
special trust relationship The often-cited words of Justice Cardozo,
then chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, illustrate this point:
"A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."8 Justice Cardozo's words
have been cited in many contexts for the principle that fiduciaries, those
within a high trust relationship, owe each other a duty of the highest
loyalty.9 Contemporary scholars have echoed this sentiment, noting that
the duties of a participant in a high trust relationship "go beyond mere
fairness and honesty."10
There is also agreement that people who violate or exploit a
relationship of special trust deserve to be punished more severely for
their crimes."' As one Ninth Circuit judge noted, "[A] person who
violates a trust may well do serious damage to the ties that bind us
together in this complex society and may, therefore, be more
5. See Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993).
6. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and Money. An Affinity-Based Model for the
Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
259,280 (1998).
7. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545,546-47 (N.Y. 1928).
& Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546-47.
9. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1692 (1990). Professor Mitchell refers to Meinhard as "the
oldest war-horse in the repertoire of corporate fiduciary duty" and notes its potent
influence on fiduciary principles. See id. at 1692-93.
10. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor. An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882. See also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,
829-30 (1983) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (noting that courts "regulate
fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them"). There are some scholars
who have challenged the traditional belief that fiduciary relationships impose special
duties on their participants and contend that the duties of a fiduciary are not special. See
Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 427.
11. See infra Part I and accompanying notes.
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reprehensible than, say, a pickpocket or a sneak thief.'' 12 This belief is
reflected in the application of common law damages where courts impose
increased sanctions, including punitive damages, on people found liable
for breaching relationships involving a high degree of trust.3
The issue upon which these groups cannot agree is how to define a
relationship of heightened trust worthy of increased obligations and
punishment. Despite the fact that the law related to fiduciary or
heightened trust relationships has been in existence for over 250 years,"
"legal theorists and practitioners have failed to define precisely when
such a relationship exists.' ' 16 This failure is due in large part to the fact
that a special trust or fiduciary relationship arises in such diverse contexts
as the attorney-client relationship and interactions between corporate
directors and their shareholders. 17 Because of this diversity, articulations
of the qualities that comprise a fiduciary relationship are often imprecise
and ill-defined."
The most recent example of the difficulties with defining a trust
relationship is the attempt by the Federal Sentencing Commission
(Commission), and ultimately the federal courts, to determine what
12. United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting).
13. See infra notes 46 and 49 (explaining the imposition of increased sanctions for
breaches of a fiduciary relationship).
14. See, e.g., Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L.J.
123, 134 (1989)("While there is widespread agreement that 'trust' is important in society,
there is at the same time a lack of agreement on what exactly constitutes trust.").
15. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045-46 (1991).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An
Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 69 (discussing the wide range of
relationships in which the fiduciary obligation can arise); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra
note 10, at 795 (noting that many individuals qualify as fiduciaries, including agents,
partners, directors, officers, bailees, and guardians, and that fiduciary relationships exist in
many areas of the law, such as criminal, labor, securities, corporations, and trusts).
18. As Professor Robert Tuttle explains, "[I]mprecise definitions of the fiduciary's
obligations correspond to the highly contextualized nature of fiduciary relationships
themselves: i.e., a specific determination of the fiduciary's duties-beyond general norms
of loyalty and care-depends not on an a priori legal construct, but on an analysis of what
a 'faithful steward' would do in this particular circumstance." Robert W. Tuttle, The
Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. OF ILL. L.R. 889,
896.
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constitutes a relationship of private trust for purposes of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).' 9 Under the Guidelines, a
sentencing court may increase the sentence of a defendant who abused a
"position of trust" in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of a particular offense. °  Courts have
struggled with the application of this provision because of an inability to
determine precisely what constitutes a "position of trust."2' Like the law
of fiduciary obligation, one of the difficulties with defining a relationship
of trust for purposes of the Guidelines is that courts have attempted to
apply the provision to a wide range of positions, including those of a
babysitter,2' a janitor,23 a truck driver," an airline agent,2 and a mail
carrier.26 Moreover, neither the Commission nor federal sentencing
judges have managed to agree on the features that characterize a
relationship of trust.27 As originally drafted, the statutory language of the
Guidelines provided virtually no guidance on this issue. The Guidelines
failed to define a position of trust, but they did provide a few examples of
the kinds of positions to which the adjustment could be applied."
Unfortunately, at least one of the examples "has produced an
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001).
20. See id.
21. One circuit court judge noted that by the middle of 1998, approximately 182
published cases in the courts of appeals addressed the abuse of trust provision, thereby
demonstrating the uncertainty of its application. See United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d
1083, 1087 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998) (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
22. See United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
babysitter who committed a sexual crime against a child was in a position of trust).
23. See United States v. Drabeck, 905 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that
a contract janitor who stole money from a bank in which he worked held a position of
trust).
24. See United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a truck
driver who stole cargo of families moving overseas was in a position of trust).
25. See United States v. Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that an
airline agent who had access to valuable information on the company's computer system
held a position of trust).
26. See United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
mail carrier is in a "quintessential position of trust" because she is free to steal mail
without fear of surveillance); United States v. Lange, 918 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a postal employee who has access to express certified mail, which is more
likely to contain valuable items, was in a position of trust). The Guidelines also provide
that "because of the special nature of the United States mail an adjustment for an abuse of
a position of trust will apply to any employee of the U.S. Postal Service who engages in the
theft or destruction of undelivered United States mail." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001).
27. See, e.g., Drabeck, 905 F.2d at 1306-07 (construing "position of trust" in the
embezzlement context).
28. See infra Part III.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
undesirable amount of confusion,"29 causing several circuits to reject its
use.3 Thus, instead of looking to the statutory language for guidance,
federal circuit courts eventually developed their own tests for defining a
position of trust.31 Unfortunately, these courts have utilized at least three
different tests that not only lead to different results, but also exclude
some relationships that traditionally fall within the scope of a special
trust relationship."' Recognizing this problem, the Commission solicited
comments to the abuse of trust provision in an effort to provide greater
guidance on the type of positions that fall within its scope.33 While these
efforts led to amendments of the Guidelines,34 federal sentencing judges
continue to struggle with determining the precise contours of a trust
relationship for purposes of applying the abuse of trust provision.35
This Article asserts that analyzing and comparing the law of fiduciary
obligation with the judicial experiences related to the Guidelines' abuse
of trust provision may shed light on the problems confronted by the
Commission and federal sentencing judges. This Article then suggests a
practical solution to these problems. Both the law of fiduciary obligation
and the abuse of trust provision rely on the concept of trust and the
notion that abuses of trust relationships pose greater harms, and
consequently deserve greater sanctions, than violations of other
relationships.36 Moreover, both apply to a wide range of contexts.37
Although some federal sentencing courts refer to fiduciary law when
29. See United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 420, 420 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting the
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits' dissatisfaction with the Commission's bank teller
example).
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32 See infra Part IV.
33. See Notice of Proposed Amendments and Additions to Sentencing Guidelines,
Policy Statements and Commentary, 55 Fed. Reg. 5,718,5,739 (Feb. 16, 1990).
34. The abuse of trust provision has been amended three times, and at least one
amendment aimed at resolving conflicts among the circuits related to the application of
the provision. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amendments 346,
492, 580 (2001)(adding language relating to discretion and responding to conflict on
whether provision applies to a defendant who pretends to occupy a position of trust).
35. See infra Part I.
36. See infra Part II.
37. Compare supra note 17 (discussing the varying relationships under fiduciary law)
with supra notes 21-26 (applying the fiduciary obligations to different positions under the
Guidelines).
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analyzing cases under the abuse of trust provision,38 there has been no
systemic attempt to use fiduciary law to shape or understand the
application of the abuse of trust provision. Given the parallels between
the two concepts, this oversight is unfortunate and may have impeded
sentencing courts' ability to fully appreciate the limits of some of their
approaches to applying the abuse of trust provision. Most notably,
because of the diverse contexts in which trust relationships arise, the law
of fiduciary obligations demonstrates that precisely defining a trust
relationship is an almost insurmountable task and may create confusion.39
This problem suggests that the Commission's attempts to define positions
of trust by creating specific examples may only increase the confusion
surrounding the application of the Guidelines in this area. 4 In this way,
analyzing the experience of defining trust in the context of fiduciary law
may have helped the Commission to appreciate the limits of its response.
More importantly, such an analysis may suggest a more practical
alternative to the Guidelines as currently written.
This Article begins by identifying the abuse of trust provision under
the Guidelines and revealing the similarities between its rationale and
the concepts underlying fiduciary obligations. Part II of this Article
briefly illustrates the difficulties that confront courts and commentators
when they attempt to determine the precise nature of a fiduciary
relationship. Part III of this Article explores the Commission's attempt
at defining trust relationships and pinpoints the sources of
commentators' dissatisfaction with those attempts. Part IV explores the
judicial effort at defining the precise contours of a special trust
relationship for purposes of the Guidelines. Part IV also demonstrates
that there is disagreement among the courts about the proper test to
apply and that many of these tests are incomplete and inconsistent with
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that in order
for the abuse of trust enhancement to apply, the defendant must occupy "a position vis-A-
vis the victim that is in the nature of a fiduciary relationship"); United States v. Brown, 47
F.3d 198, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that a position of trust refers to a relationship that
is fiduciary in nature).
39. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 881. See also Alan M. Weinberger, Expanding the
Fiduciary Relationship Bestiary: Does Concurrent Ownership Satisfy the Family
Resemblance Test?, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1767,1779-80 (1994). Professor Weinberger
notes that while the category of relationships giving rise to a fiduciary duty is not closed,
"there is widespread disagreement concerning the identity of the members and a shared
sense of mystery in English-speaking countries surrounding the criteria for admission of
new or 'unconventional' members. A certain vagueness in fiduciary law may be essential
to the purposes served by the doctrine." Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. See Notice of Proposed Amendments and Additions to Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 33 (explaining the amendments to the Guidelines); see also infra Part I1.
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the policies of the Guidelines. Part V discusses how experiences related
to fiduciary law add value to judicial efforts at defining trust in the
sentencing arena.
I. SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN THE GUIDELINES AND THE LAW OF
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
The concepts underlying the Guidelines' abuse of trust provision
appear to mirror those embedded in the law of fiduciary obligation. At
their cores, both are based on trust relationships and the notion that
abuses of trust create special harms. Accordingly, trust relationships
deserve special protections. This Part scrutinizes the similarities between
fiduciary law and the Guidelines.
As an initial matter, both the Guidelines4' and the law of fiduciary
obligation42 center on the concept of trust. The Guidelines explicitly
apply to positions of "trust." 43 Fiduciary law also concerns trust because
a fiduciary relationship is one that involves special trust between its
participants." Indeed, the term fiduciary "was adopted to apply to
situations falling short of 'trusts' but in which one person was nonetheless
obligated to act like a trustee.,
45
Also, both the law of fiduciary obligation46and the Guidelines47 impose
increased or special sanctions on those who abuse a special trust
relationship. The text of the abuse of trust provision is straightforward
and mandates a two-level increase if a defendant "abused a position of
public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the
41. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001) (authorizing
the increase in penalties for abuse of a position of trust).
42. See, e.g., J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties and
Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law ofAgency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439,
442 (1997) ("A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust . .
43. See id.
44. See Hynes, supra note 41, at 442; Clark, supra note 17, at 69 ("The law imposes a
fiduciary obligation on certain relationships where one party stands in a position of trust
relative to another."); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 800 n.17 (noting that the
concept of trusting is included in most definitions of fiduciaries).
45. DeMott, supra note 10, at 880.
46. See Ellen A. Scallen, Promises Broken v. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 897, 911-14 (explaining that a
fiduciary may be subject to increased damages).
47. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001).
2002]
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commission or concealment of the offense." ' Such increased sanctions
also exist in fiduciary law.49 Although there is a general rule against
punitive damages for breach of contract, breach of a fiduciary
relationship qualifies for such increased damages." Similarly, in tort
actions, punitive damages are available when there is a violation of a
fiduciary duty even when such a violation is not an independent tort.51 In
addition, courts apply a broad range of sanctions to those who breach a
fiduciary relationship." Although it is not as straightforward as the
Guidelines, caselaw demonstrates that courts are willing to impose more
severe punishments on fiduciaries who breach their duties than non-
fiduciaries who engage in similar conduct.53
In the context of the Guidelines and fiduciary law, recent court
decisions suggest that increased sanctions demonstrate the greater
culpability of violators who take advantage of the relative vulnerability
of others within a special trust relationship.-" Thus, in the official
commentary to the Guidelines' abuse of trust provision (Commentary),
the Commission stated that people who abuse a position of trust are
"more culpable."55 Federal judges agree:
By viewing as especially culpable persons who "abuse" their
positions of trust, the guideline also recognizes the time-
48 Id.
49. See Scallen, supra note 46, at 911-14; DeMott, supra note 10, at 900-01 (noting
increased penalties for fiduciaries). The Supreme Court has also shown a willingness to
impose heightened obligations on "special confidential relationships." See e.g., Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 645-55, 655 n.14 (1983) (noting a breach of a special confidential
relationship between underwriters or consultants and the corporation could form the basis
for liability under federal securities laws). See also STEPHEN S. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES
LAW: INSIDER TRADING 119-20 (1999) (noting that the cumulative and severe penalties
associated with insider trading can stem from a breach of a fiduciary duty); MARC 1.
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW, 310 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the severe
penalties associated with insider trading).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (stating that punitive
damages may be recovered for breach of contract only if the breach also constitutes a tort
that allows for punitive damages); William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in
Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 636 (1999).
51. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §
14-3, at 589-90 (3d ed. 1987).
52 See Scallen, supra note 46, at 911-12 (noting that the damages courts award for a
breach of a fiduciary duty encompass a wider range of remedies than those related to
breaches of contract).
53. See id. (discussing remedies available against parties who breach a trust
relationship).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001).
55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. background (2001).
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honored legal concept that theft by deceit is to be dealt with
more harshly than simple theft.... [and that] a decision to take
advantage of that trust .. . is particularly abhorrent, as it
undermines faith in one's fellow man in a way that the ordinary
pick-pocket simply cannot."6
In other words, federal sentencing judges have long accepted the
notion that defendants who abuse a trust relationship deserve harsher
sanctions because their abuse poses a greater threat to society than that
of defendants who violate an arms-length relationship.57
Legal scholars have reached a similar understanding in the context of
breaches of a fiduciary or special trust relationship. Professor Tamar
Frankel notes that fiduciary law reflects the notion that it is more
reprehensible to harm someone within a heightened trust relationship."
Professor Frankel explains that the fiduciary obtains power to carry out
his functions on behalf of the other participant in the fiduciary
relationship, known as the "entrustor."59 However, the delegation of
power to the fiduciary creates a significant risk that he will abuse his
authority and injure the entrustor.60 Frankel notes that this risk is greater
in a fiduciary relationship; while theft may be discovered in a non-
fiduciary relationship, stealing will go undiscovered in a fiduciary one
because the fiduciary has enhanced power and discretion over the
entrustor and her property.61 Similarly, Professor Deborah DeMott
56. Ragland, 72 F.3d at 503.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1209, 1226
(1995) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Duties]; Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at
832 (commenting that while it is wrong to injure anyone, "it is more reprehensible to
injure someone who cannot protect himself, as an entrustor in a fiduciary relation is.")
59. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 832.
60. See id.
61. See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 58, at 127. Professor Frankel notes that
"[c]ourts regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them."
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 829-30. Professor Frankel explains that these
moral standards encompass high duties of fidelity, faith, and honor. See id. at 830. She
further notes that the moral behavior of fiduciaries is both altruistic and voluntary. See id.
This moral theme stems, in part, from the vulnerability of the participants within a
fiduciary relationship and the serious problems posed by abuses of fiduciary authority. See
2002] 1033
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notes that one party's vulnerability to the other often justifies the
imposition of fiduciary obligations.62
Believing that they pose these special problems and harms, courts and
commentators view breaches of fiduciary relationships with special
disfavor. The Guidelines' abuse of trust provision also reflects this
disfavor.6 Given the parallels between the premises underlying the
abuse of trust provision and those embodied in fiduciary law, analyzing
the problems associated with defining a fiduciary relationship may afford
a better understanding of the complexities involved in defining a position
of trust in the context of the Guidelines.
II. FIDUCIARY CONFUSION
While there seems to be agreement that fiduciaries deserve special
protection and that those who abuse their fiduciary obligation deserve
harsher sanctions, courts historically have struggled with determining
how to identify a fiduciary or special trust relationship. 64 As Professor
DeMott comments, "[f]iduciary obligation is one of the most elusive
concepts in Anglo-American law.,
65
Many argue that this elusiveness stems from the fact that a fiduciary
obligation can arise in a variety of different contexts. 66 For example, one
classic fiduciary relationship is that between co-partners in a general
partnership. 6' Another traditional fiduciary relationship arises between aguardian and a ward.68 While these relationships both involve a high
62. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 902.
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.I, cmt. background (2001).
64. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 10, at 879.
65. Id.
66. See Clark, supra note 17, at 70 ("The goal of harmonizing the legal principle
referred to as 'fiduciary obligations' in these disparate contexts has challenged theorists
for the last half century.") (footnote omitted); Hynes, supra note 41, at 442-43 (noting that
"the very breadth of the fiduciary principle and the indeterminate number and kind of
relationships that it touches lead to... considerable vagueness and ambiguity") (footnote
omitted); Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL
L. REv., 21, 24 (1992) ("[Tjhe use of similar language to refer to differing obligations and
standards of conduct makes the underlying concepts of fiduciary law difficult to grasp.");
DeMott, supra note 10, at 908 ("[F]iduciary obligation eludes theoretical capture because
it arises in diverse types of relationships.").
67. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 17, at 69; Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at
795. Indeed, Meinhard rested on the fiduciary relationship between partners. Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (N.Y. 1928) Even though the relationship at issue involved a
joint venture, the court reasoned that the principles related to a joint venture were no
different from those involved in a partnership relationship. See id.
68. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 17, at 69; Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at
795. See also GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
1034 [Vol. 51:101
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degree of trust, they are very different.69 The partnership relationship
can be created without an explicit agreement,7° whereas a guardian
typically must voluntarily accept his or her role.7 Further, a partnership
relationship is based on the sharing of power and authority,7" while the
guardian-ward relationship is characterized by an imbalance in power.
73
Differences such as these make it difficult to define the precise qualities
of a fiduciary relationship and to pinpoint those qualities that justify the
imposition of increased obligations and penalties.
The task of defining a fiduciary relationship is exacerbated by the fact
that commentators cannot agree on the qualities of a relationship that
justify the imposition of a fiduciary obligation.74 Indeed, like the federal
sentencing courts in the context of the Guidelines, judges and
commentators have developed several different theories to explain the
importance of certain qualities found within a fiduciary relationship and
the manner in which such qualities distinguish a fiduciary relationship
from other kinds of relationships.75 Unfortunately, the explanatory value
of these theories is limited in large part by the fact that such qualities are
not duplicated in the varying contexts in which the fiduciary obligations
arise. This section will explain some of the more prevalent theories
TRUSTEES § 482, at 280 (rev. 2d ed. 1978) (stating that conventional categories of fiduciary
relationships include guardian and ward, as well as trustee and beneficiary, executor and
creditor, principal and agent, and corporate director and corporation).
69. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 6 (1914) (stating that a partnership is created by two
or more people conducting business for profit as co-owners). Even when parties do not
agree to form a partnership, courts nonetheless may conclude that they have inadvertently
formed a partnership, and as a consequence, the partners owe each other fiduciary duties.
See, e.g., Hilco Property Servs., Inc. v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 526, 536 (D.N.H. 1996)
(noting key determination of a partnership is not the subjective intent of the parties, but
the circumstances surrounding their relationship); Arnold v. Erkmann, 934 S.W.2d 621,
630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("The primary criterion is the parties' intention to enter a
relationship which in law constitutes a partnership; intent to form a partnership is not
necessary.").
71. See Bogert & Bogert, supra note 68.
7Z See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e) (1994) (stating that "[a]ll partners have equal rights
in the management and conduct of the partnership business").
73. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 904 ("The ward's dependence on the guardian, [is]
the defining feature of their relationship . .
74. See infra Part II A-D.
75. See infra Part IV (discussing various theories).
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related to fiduciary relationships and offer some critiques of those
theories.
A. Analogies
Much of the law of fiduciary obligation has resorted to the use of
analogy to determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship.7 6 This
process begins with identifying those relationships that have been
described as traditional or conventional fiduciary relationships. 7 Courts
then compare the relationship at issue with these conventional
relationships to determine if there are similarities between the two.78 In
this way, "the law of fiduciary obligation has developed through analogy
to contexts in which the obligation conventionally applies." 79 However,
Professors DeMott and Frankel warn that using analogies to determine
the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship has proven unhelpful and
that analogies to traditional relationships often cannot be adapted to new
situations and relationships.8" Also, courts generally fail to pinpoint the
reasons why particular similarities between relationships give rise to
fiduciary responsibilities.8' These problems undermine the effectiveness
of analogies as an analytical tooli 2
B. Voluntary Assumption
Professor Austin Scott has asserted that fiduciary obligations may be
justified on the basis that someone voluntarily acts on another's behalf.83
Similarly, Professor Schaumann has stated, "A party should be bound by
fiduciary ties to another only if the party has voluntarily assumed the
fiduciary role. Fiduciary power cannot be imposed on a party against its
will, or without its knowledge."8 The acceptance of the power carries
with it a corresponding duty and obligation to act in the best interests of
76. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 914.
77. See id. at 908-09.
7& See id.
79. Id. at 879; see also Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 805 (explaining that
courts began to use analogies to determine if new relations were fiduciary in nature).
80. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 805. After analyzing the difficulties
with the use of analogy, Frankel concludes, "analogies are not helpful in solving specific
problems that new situations pose, because the rules that apply to the old prototypes do
not necessarily respond to the problems posed by the new ones." Id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539, 540 (1949)
(defining the nature of a fiduciary person).
84. Schaumann, supra note 66, at 56.
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the other party. Under this rationale, voluntary acceptance of the
fiduciary role will result in a person being held accountable for violation
of the responsibilities inherent in the role. Nonetheless, Professor
DeMott warns, "exceptions too significant to dismiss undercut the appeal
of Scott's formulation. ' '" For example, Scott's assertions fail to account
for relationships such as partnerships, pursuant to which fiduciary
obligations may arise despite the lack of an express undertaking among
the parties."
C. Entrustment
Others have argued that the fiduciary constraint applies because
something of value is entrusted to one of the parties.9 This certainly
applies to those situations in which a fiduciary, like a trustee, is
responsible for the care of some valuable property. ° Undoubtedly, it is
important to impose heightened obligations on those who care for
valuable property in order to decrease the temptation to misappropriate
that property. 91 However, this formulation does not adequately explain
those contexts in which the fiduciary serves in an advisory capacity.
2
Indeed, it may not apply neatly to many conventional fiduciary
relationships. 93 Thus, co-partners may entrust one another with the care
of their partnership business, but this entrustment may not capture the
essence of the relationship between partners. Moreover, although the
85. See id. at 56-7.
86. See id.
87. DeMott, supra note 10, at 910.
88. See id. at 911; Scallen, supra note 46, at 919-20 (noting that the assumption theory
fails to account for those fiduciary relationships that arise without an express contract).
89. See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 58, at 1212; DeMott, supra note 10, at
912 (explaining that the entrustment concept works best when the fiduciary is a property
holder).
90. See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 58, at 1212 (elaborating that in fiduciary
relationships other than those dealing with real or personal property, it is difficult to
determine what is being entrusted to the fiduciary).
91. See id. at 1215-17 (noting that fiduciary law imposes duties on fiduciaries to insure
against the misappropriation of the entrustor's property).
92 See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 10, at 912 (noting the difficulty in determining what
a lawyer has been entrusted with other than the confidence of the client).
93. See id.
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lawyer-client relationship is clearly fiduciary in nature,"' it is unclear what
the client entrusts to his lawyer.9 One may argue that an attorney is
entrusted with valuable information. However, the mere fact that an
attorney is provided with valuable or sensitive information may not
define adequately a heightened trust relationship worthy of the
protection of fiduciary law. This is especially true given that many
participants of arms-length transactions receive confidential information,
yet the law does not consider all of those participants to be parties to
fiduciary relationships.
D. Reliance
Still others have maintained that fiduciary duties may be justified
because of the reliance that one party places on another.96 Certainly an
important component of any fiduciary relationship is a higher-than-
average degree of reliance.97 Just as one partner relies on the other
partner's good faith, a ward relies on her guardian's honesty and
integrity. This theory, however, may be overly broad. Indeed, almost all
contracts involve reliance on the part of the party entering into the
contract.98 This fact diminishes the importance of reliance as a dividing
line between those relationships that confer fiduciary obligations and
those that do not.99 Moreover, a theory based on reliance is problematic
because it focuses on the beneficiary's conduct to the exclusion of the
fiduciary.10' As a consequence, it fails to address whether reliance must
be accepted in order for the obligation to arise. May a fiduciary
obligation be imposed based solely on one person's reliance on another's
integrity? An affirmative response highlights the problems with such a
theory while a negative one reveals its limits. In this way, reliance seems
a necessary, but insufficient, feature of a fiduciary relationship.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting the
fiduciary nature of lawyer-client relationship).
95. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 912.
96. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1684. ("A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of
power and dependency in which the dependent party relies upon the power holder to
conduct some aspect of a dependent's life over which the power holder has been given and
accepted responsibility."); see also Ernest Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1, 17 (1975) (noting that one party in all fiduciary relationships is at the
mercy of the other party's discretion).
97. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1684.
9& See Scallen, supra note 46, at 918.
99. Seeid. at 918.
100. See id. at 917-18.
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In the end, commentators concur on the difficulty of finding a precise
set of factors that apply to all forms of fiduciary relationships.' It is
difficult to reconcile the various theories with one another, and no one
theory appears to apply to every kind of relationship that can arise in the
context of fiduciary law. Instead, there appears to have emerged a
general understanding that many, if not all, of the above-mentioned
qualities may define a fiduciary relationship, depending on the context
and circumstances in which a given relationship arises. Thus, scholars
apply general rules with varying degrees of force, depending on the
particular relationship at issue.
III. TRUST AS DEFINED BY THE COMMISSION
A similar confusion describes the Commission's and courts'
experiences with the Guidelines' abuse of trust provision. The
Guidelines mandate an upward departure if a defendant "abused a
position of ... private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated
the commission or concealment of the offense."' In applying this
enhancement, courts must conduct a two-step inquiry. First, courts must
examine whether the defendant maintained a position of trust; "[i]f not,
the inquiry ends and no enhancement accrues."'' 3  Second, if it is
determined that the defendant occupied a position of trust, the court
must ascertain whether the defendant utilized the position to facilitate or
conceal a crime.' 4 This second step "has proven to be rather easily
met."' ' In contrast, courts have experienced difficulty in responding to
the first part of the inquiry.'O"
Unfortunately, the language of the statute offers little guidance on how
to determine the existence of a position of trust. The Commentary
explains a position of trust as follows:
101. See Schaumann, supra note 66, at 27 ("Although so far no single theory of
fiduciary duty has won universal acceptance, there is consensus on many fundamental
points.").
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001).
103. United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998).
104. See id.
105. Erich D. Andersen, Enhancement for "Abuse of a Position of Trust" Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 70 OR. L. REv. 181, 194 (1991).
106. See id. at 188 (noting that courts have had "tremendous difficulty in determining
what it means to 'abuse a position of public or private trust"').
2002] 1039
Catholic University Law Review
"Public or private trust" refers to a position of public or private
trust characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e.,
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
considerable deference). Persons holding such positions
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-
discretionary in nature. For this adjustment to apply, the
position of public or private trust must have contributed in
some significant way to facilitating the commission or
concealment of the offense (e.g., by making the detection of the
offense or the defendant's responsibility for the offense more
difficult).I°
The Commentary attempts to clarify this definition further by
providing examples of the kinds of positions that would fall within and
outside of its scope.
This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an
embezzlement of a client's funds by an attorney serving as a
guardian, a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme, or the
criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise
of an examination. This adjustment does not apply in the case
of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel
clerk because such positions are not characterized by the above-
described factors.w
Applying these concepts, courts have attempted to account for at least
two aspects of the statutory language: (1) the use of the term
"position,"' 9 and (2) the exclusion of an ordinary bank teller.""
A. The Primacy of Position
The Commission's use of the word "position" caused some judges to
exclude relationships that involved a high degree of trust from the
Guidelines' application and ultimately led to an amendment of the
provision."' Because the Guidelines state that the abuse of trust
provision applies to defendants who occupy some "position" of trust,
they appear to require that a defendant actually hold a "position" in
order to fall under the scope of the Guidelines. 2 Thus, such language
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001).
108. Id.
109. See infra Part III.A.
110. See infra Part III.B.
111. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
112. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001). See also
United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995).
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appears to preclude an enhancement for those who misrepresent that
they occupy a formal position."3 As a consequence, some courts refused
to apply the adjustment to defendants who pretended to hold a position,
but in fact did not."4 These courts reasoned that if a defendant holds a
position in a sham corporation, then the defendant truly never occupied
a "position" of trust and his activities could not fall within the scope of
the provision."5 Other courts disagreed and concluded that even holding
a fraudulent position of trust satisfied the requirement that the defendant
must hold some "position" because defendants engaging in such
pretenses pose the same harms as those who actually hold legitimate
positions of trust."6 This conflict among the courts prompted the
Commission to amend the Guidelines in 1998 to include defendants who
pretend to hold positions of trust."'
Unfortunately, this amendment fails to address other defects
concerning the term "position."' Consistent with the amendment,
courts have required that a defendant either occupy a "formal" position
or create "sufficient indicia that he holds such a position" to fall within
the scope of the provision. " 9  This excludes those defendants who
113. See, e.g., United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing to
apply enhancement to a defendant who pretended to be a physician because such




116. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 125 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying to
defendant who impersonated a doctor); United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir.
1996) (applying to defendant who posed as psychologist); United States v. Queen, 4 F.3d
925, 928-30 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying to defendant who posed as financial broker).
117. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 580 (2001). The
Commission added a comment to the abuse of trust provision that states: "This adjustment
also applies in a case in which the defendant provides sufficient indicia to the victim that
the defendant legitimately holds a position of private or public trust when, in fact, the
defendant does not." Id. The Commentary further explains that the adjustment applies to
a person "who perpetrates a financial fraud by leading investors to believe that [he] is a
legitimate investment broker." Id. The Commission includes those who pretend to
occupy positions of trust because those who falsely assume roles are as culpable as those
who abuse an actual position. See id.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201-02 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Queen, 4 F.3d at 929 n.3).
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participate in a trusting relationship with their victims, but do not occupy
a formal position vis-A-vis their victims.
For example, in United States v. Iannone,2° the defendant established a
company and appointed himself the chief executive officer.'2 ' He then
encouraged several war veterans to invest in an oil and gas drilling
venture by pretending to be a decorated Vietnam veteran and by
befriending other veterans through an online chat room for veterans.
' 2
The defendant later misappropriated the invested funds. '23 The Third
Circuit recognized that the defendant exercised special influence over his
victims by using his fabricated combat experience to gain their trust.
24
The defendant argued that the Guidelines could not be applied to him
merely because he had developed a trusting relationship with his
victims. '2' The Third Circuit appeared to agree but noted that the
defendant's argument ignored the "critical fact of th[e] case" that the
defendant solicited investments "in his capacity as head of a company.'
26
In this way, the appeals court based its application of the abuse of trust
provision on whether or not the defendant held a formal "position.'
' 27
This focus on "position," though grounded in statutory language,'
28
appears misguided and potentially excludes many relationships of
heightened trust. Clearly, one can be involved in a relationship of trust
without occupying a formal position. Thus, in lannone, the most
"critical" factor seems to be the special trust the defendant garnered
through fraudulent means, not that the defendant served as owner of a
particular company.' 2' Put another way, if the defendant had used his
relationships to entice people to invest in someone else's company, he
would have violated the same trust that investors had conferred upon
him. The court's focus on "position" misses the point that the trust in
these relationships stems not from the title, but from the discretion
exercised over those within the relationship.
120. 185 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
121. See id. at 223.
122. See id. at 214-21 (explaining that the defendant actively encouraged relationships
with his victims by preying on the trust and loyalty the victims felt for fellow combat
veterans).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 225.
125. See id. at 220-22.
126. See id. at 225 n7.
127. See id. at 222-25.
128. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
129. See lannone, 184 F.3d at 222-25.
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Moreover, to the extent that it is outcome-determinative, the judicial
preoccupation with "position" seems an unreasonably mechanical
approach for basing a sentencing enhancement. The mere fact that the
defendant structured his crime without the inclusion of a formal position
should not enable him to escape the sanctions of the abuse of trust
provision.
B. The Bank Teller Exclusion
Some courts have relied on the ordinary bank teller exclusion to
exempt certain employees from the abuse of trust provision of the
Guidelines. 3 The Commentary states that the abuse of trust provision
does not apply "in the case of ... theft by an ordinary bank teller.""13
Based on this language, some courts have reasoned that "the abuse of
trust enhancement does not apply to bank tellers because they generally
do not have sufficient managerial discretion to create a trust
relationship." '32 Extending this rationale, some judges have refused to
apply the abuse of trust position to all low-level employees, arguing that
such employees have no managerial discretion and hold positions similar
to bank tellers.'33 Courts who apply this theory determine if someone
occupies a position of trust by analogizing the bank teller position with
the particular job held by the defendant. Thus, in one case, the Northern
District of Illinois refused to apply the abuse of trust provision to a mail
carrier because his position had no managerial authority and was
indistinguishable from that of a regular bank teller 4 In contrast, in
another case, the defendant's position as a bank vault teller afforded her
a great deal of responsibility and enabled her to escape the security
checks required for other bank tellers."3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
held that her position as vault teller included responsibilities beyond
those of an ordinary bank teller and could be characterized as a position
of trust.'36
130. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
defendant-bank teller was exempt from the Guidelines' enhancement).
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001).
132. United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 765 F. Supp. 945, 949 (N.D. II. 1991).
134. See id. at 949 (citing United States v. Lange, 918 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1990)).
135. See United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1998).
136. See id. at 1085.
10432002]
Catholic University Law Review
Several courts have rejected the bank teller exclusion as under-
inclusive and too mechanistic because it excludes defendants based on
their relative seniority within a company or job description.137 The level
of a person's employment or her job title may not reveal the degree of
trust she is afforded. For example, although a policeman may be a low-
level employee within the departmental organizational chart, she
undoubtedly occupies a position of trust for purposes of the Guideline."'
In this way, rather than focusing on the nature of the relationship
between the defendant and her victim, the bank teller exclusion leads
courts to decide cases based on "formalistic definitions of job type."'39
In addition to recognizing the limits of its use, some courts,'" United
States Attorneys, 4' and even a former member of the federal sentencing
council,'42 have argued that the bank teller exclusion is inconsistent with
the underlying rationale of the provision and should be discarded. They
argue that many bank tellers do occupy a position of trust because they
are entrusted with customer funds and both the customers and their
employer rely on their trustworthiness to insure that the funds are not
misused. 4 1 Judicial confusion results from these attempts to create a
standard for distinguishing between bank tellers and other employees.'44
To illustrate, after reviewing various circuit courts' analysis of the bank
teller exclusion, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the exclusion should
be rejected because its effect was to "confound the plain meaning of the
137. See, e.g., Akinkoye, 185 F.3d at 203 (calling the approach "mechanistic" and
rejecting it because it "exclude[s] defendants from consideration based on their job
titles"); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Brann, 990 F.2d 98, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 418-19 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("Merely looking at where an employee fits into a hierarchical structure is a far
too simplistic approach to determining whether a defendant occupies a position of trust.").
13& See Lamb, 6 F.3d at 41.8-19.
139. See United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263,269 (4th Cir. 1995).
140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
141. See United States v. Odoms, 801 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. I11. 992).
142. See id. at 64 n.20 (citing a former member of the sentencing council as stating that
the bank teller exclusion has created an "irreconcilable conflict" for sentencing judges
attempting to apply the abuse of trust provision).
143. As the Ninth Circuit explained, "we are somewhat at a loss to understand why the
Sentencing Commission believes that an ordinary bank teller who embezzles should not
receive the enhancement." United States v. Drabeck, 905 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990),
cited with approval in United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 917 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1305 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1991).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1993); Odonis, 801 F.
Supp. at 63-4.
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guideline and distort the analysis of courts applying it.' '145 Other circuits
concur with this conclusion.' 4 Echoing the Seventh Circuit's sentiment, a
former member of the sentencing council also noted that the exclusion
should be disregarded.147
As this Part reveals, the statutory language of the Guidelines has
generated considerable confusion among courts regarding the proper
method of determining a position of trust. Moreover, the Commission's
attempts to alter the language have failed to remedy this confusion.
IV. TRUST AS DEFINED BY THE COURTS
In developing their own techniques for identifying a position of trust,
courts have fared no better than the Commission in creating precise and
easily applicable criteria. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[t]he confusion
obvious in the disparity of the approaches of the circuits was a mirror of
the halting attempt of the Sentencing Commission to provide guidance
on the appropriate use of this enhancement."' While there seems to be
agreement among federal judges on the validity of the enhancement,
there is no judicial consensus on the characteristics necessary to establish
a position of trust. Some courts have focused their inquiry on the extent
to which one person is afforded access or authority over the valuable
property of another.149 Other courts have analyzed the extent to which a
position allows its participants to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong.150
Yet another approach emphasizes the degree of discretion conferred on
a person occupying a particular position.' Each of these approaches
suffers from inadequacies.52
145. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. at 63-4; accord Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420 (noting that the result of
the bank exclusion has been that "courts have jumped over hurdles to contort their
analysis of the Guideline...").
146. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
147. See Odoms, 801 F. Supp at 64 n.20.
148. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d at 917.
149. See infra Part IV.A.
150. See infra Part IV.B.
151. See infra Part IV.C.
152 See infra Part IV.A-C.
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A. Access and Authority
Under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, a defendant's "access or
authority over valuable things" characterizes a position of trust.'53 In
United States v. Lilly, the Seventh Circuit found that a pastor who
convinced his parishioners to contribute funds to a bogus investment
scheme occupied a position of trust for the purposes of the abuse of trust
provision.i" The court reasoned that church members had entrusted
Pastor Lilly with access or authority over two valuable things: the
church's bank accounts and the financial direction of the church.'55 First,
his position gave him sole authority over the church bank account from
which he transferred funds into his personal account."" Second, as the
church's financial decision-maker, the pastor was the sole manager of the
church's finances, which enabled him to secretly misapply those funds.'57
Because he had this kind of access and authority, the pastor's position
was one of trust within the meaning of the Guidelines.'58
The Seventh Circuit's test seems appropriate in some settings. It
would be applicable to an attorney who has access to a client's funds or a
financial advisor who has control over a client's investment accounts.
In other situations, the standard may be applicable to employees such as
loan officers and postal workers who clearly have access or authority
over valuable property; that is, loan officers have access to money, while
postal workers have access to mail. 6 Unlike an attorney or financial
advisor, however, these employees may not have authority or discretion
to determine the manner in which the property is used. Yet, it seems
clear that the access afforded to loan officers or postal workers gives
them the kind of trust provided by the Guidelines.
However, a broad reading of this formulation may be over-inclusive
because many people may have a similar form of access without ever
forming a trusting relationship. In Lilly, for example, while the court
noted that Pastor Lilly had sole access over the church's bank accounts,
153. See United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States
v. Dorsey, 27 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1994)).
154. See id. at 1224-25.
155. See id. at 1227-28.
156. See id. at 1227.
157. See id. at 1227-28.
15& See id.
159. See id. at 1227 (characterizing a position of trust to include a person who has
"access or authority over valuable things").
160. See, e.g., United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Lange, 918 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining the special access that mail carriers
have to mail, which justifies classifying their role as a position of trust).
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the court also stated that the pastor "directed church personnel to
transfer funds... 6 Thus, others in the church had access to the accounts
without having a relationship with the victims.' 62 The court must have
found a fundamental difference between the access conferred on the
pastor and the access other church members enjoyed.' 63 Unfortunately,
the court's test fails to indicate how such a distinction can or should be
made.' 64
A similar problem can be seen in the context of other investment-
related frauds. In a typical investment scam, a defendant will induce
investors to deposit funds into an account over which he has
considerable, if not sole, access and authority.'6 Under the Seventh
Circuit's theory, all defendants who commit these frauds might be
eligible for enhanced punishment even when no trusting relationship has
arisen. Recognizing the flaw in this rationale, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the argument that the defendant's total control over all of his
investors' funds warranted a finding that he occupied a position of
trust.' 66 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, the fact that the defendant had
control over all of his investor's accounts "is merely another way of
saying he controlled an elaborate, well-organized ponzi scheme" and fails
to specify whether he developed any special relationships with his
investors.' 67 This argument recognizes that enabling someone to take
possession of another's property in the course of her work does not mean
that she occupies a "position of trust" for purposes of the Guidelines.'
16
For this reason, the Seventh Circuit's theory may be of limited use.
Moreover, this theory may be under-inclusive because it fails to
account for schemes that do not involve the perpetrators taking physical
possession of a person's property. The "access or authority" rationale
works best for defendants who occupy positions in which they manage or




165. See United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
concept of control over assets "applies to all investor relationships").
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1567.
168. See United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (arguing that a
clerical postal worker does not occupy the same "position of trust" as managers who
possess greater fiduciary duties).
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have control over money.'69 However, it does not work for situations in
which the perpetrator serves solely as an advisor. Courts agree that an
attorney serving as an advisor to a client occupies a position of trust for
purposes of the Guidelines.'70 This is true irrespective of whether the
attorney is entrusted with her client's money.'7' By the same token,
courts have noted that a financial advisor serves in a similar position of
trust for purposes of the Guidelines.'2 Such advisors, while privy to
confidential and valuable information, may not have access to any
tangible property such as money or other assets. In this respect, the
access or authority rationale suffers from the same limitations as the
entrustment theory under fiduciary law. 73 Like that theory, the Seventh
Circuit's formulation fails to account fully for traditional kinds of trust
relationships.
B. Freedom to Commit "Difficult-to-Detect" Crimes
Some courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit's theory that the critical
inquiry for an abuse of trust enhancement "is the extent to which the
position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong."' 74
The rationale for this theory is as follows:
If a person is in a relationship such that any attempt by a
defendant to abuse the relationship could be simply or readily
noticed by the second party to the relationship, presumably the
two persons have not formed a "trust" relationship.
Conversely, if one party is able to take criminal advantage of
the relationship without fear of ready or quick notice by the
second party, the second party has clearly placed a level of trust
in the first.'
169. See id. at 635-36 (emphasizing that attorneys or bank executives embezzling funds
would commit a breach of trust).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Post, 25 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 1994).
171. See id. (holding that status as a licensed attorney placed the defendant in a
position of public trust).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Gottlieb, No. 93-5255, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22954, at
*5 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1289 (1st Cir. .1992) (noting that
financial advisors "[v]irtually by definition" occupy a position of private trust within the
meaning of the Guidelines).
173. See supra Part II.C.
174. United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). See also United States v.
Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 838
(11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the primary concern of the abuse of trust provision is to
penalize defendants who take advantage of a position that provides them the ability to
commit or hide a difficult-to-detect wrong).
175. Hill, 915 F.2d at 506.
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The difficult-to-detect theory has statutory grounding.176  The
Commentary explains that in order for the enhancement to apply, "the
position of public or private trust must have contributed in some
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the
offense (e.g., by making the detection of the offense or the defendant's
responsibility for the offense more difficult)."' 77 Based on this language
and mirroring the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have noted that whether the defendant is able to commit a
difficult to detect crime is the cornerstone of a position of trust.78
However, other courts have criticized a reliance on this factor because
it too often overemphasizes the extent to which a person is monitored or
supervised."7  Indeed, some prosecutors have argued for the
enhancement to apply when the defendant's conduct may have been
discovered if the supervisors had not been "inept,... sloppy, and derelict
in their duty."18  While courts applying this theory assert that "being
subject to lax supervision alone does not convert one's job into a
'position of trust,"""' the cases reveal that courts have allowed a lack of
supervision to determine whether a defendant holds a position of trust.""
In fact, courts reason that a lack of oversight allows a defendant to
commit a difficult to detect crime and illustrates that he holds a position
of trust.'1 Thus, in finding that a real estate agent occupied a position of
trust, the Fourth Circuit focused on his ability to set his own schedule
and work odd hours with little supervision.' Such a focus suggests that
the defendant employer's failure to oversee his employee's actions
triggered the determination that the defendant held a position of trust.
The Ninth Circuit examined the actions of a defendant supply
coordinator who purchased office supplies for a bank and engaged in a
176. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001).
177. Id.
178. See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 838; Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201.
179. See United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that courts
too often "emphasize... erroneously, the supervision an employee receives").
180. See United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867, 869-870 (4th Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 870 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001));
accord Isaacson, 155 F.3d at 1085.
182. See, e.g., Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201-02; United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 473 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1993).
183. See e.g., Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201-02; Lowder, 5 F.3d at 473; Queen, 4 F.3d at 929-30.
184. See United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 204 (4th Cir. 1999).
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pattern of purchasing unnecessary office supplies and returning them for
cash.' 5 The court found that the defendant occupied a position of trust
meriting a sentencing enhancement."" In making this assessment, the
court relied on the fact that the defendant restricted access to his supply
office, the office was in a remote building removed from his supervisors,
and the office was sloppy and disorganized so that only the defendant
could determine its contents.187 According to the court, these facts
showed that the defendant could not be under close supervision, and
hence, he could pursue his scheme without detection."" Therefore, his
job enabled him to commit a difficult-to-detect crime indicating that he
held a position of trust.'89 These cases illustrate the courts' tendency to
find that a defendant held a position of trust due to his employer's failure
to oversee adequately his activities.
However, while oversight might be important, it cannot completely
define a position of trust. As the Sixth Circuit has emphasized, when
there is less direct supervision over some employees, it is more difficult
to detect their transgressions, which explains in part the distinction
between a trust relationship and a non-trust relationship. '" Pointedly, an
analysis focusing on supervision fails to evaluate both the nature of the
position held by the defendant and the nature of the relationship
between the defendant and the victim.' 9' Indeed, the fact that a
defendant is able to commit a crime with ease may suggest that the
defendant occupies a position of trust, but it does not identify the quality
that defines such a position. The crux of the inquiry should be whether
the relationship between the victim and defendant is of such a character
that the victim does not feel compelled to investigate the activities of the
defendant and conversely that the defendant does not feel the necessity
of taking precautions against detection. The freedom to commit a
difficult-to-detect crime theory does not respond to that issue and
consequently fails to pinpoint properly the difference between a position
that confers trust and one that does not. Because the theory
overemphasizes supervision, it improperly incorporates some defendants'
conduct based solely on the fact that their victims are not diligent enough
to discover their activities.
185. See United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).




190. See United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996).
191. See id.
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C. Discretion
Several federal circuits believe that "the level of discretion accorded an
employee is to be the decisive factor in determining whether his position
was one that can be characterized as a trust position. ' 92 These courts
agree that the amount of discretion afforded a defendant captures the
essence of the trust relationship.9
Where an individual makes himself particularly vulnerable by
entrusting another with substantial authority and discretion to
act on his behalf and then relies upon and defers to that person,
a decision to take advantage of that trust and vulnerability is
particularly abhorrent, as it undermines faith in one's fellow
man in a way that the ordinary pickpocket simply cannot. 94
Like the difficult-to-detect rationale, the text of the provision appears
to support the proposition that discretion is a critical component of a
private trust relationship. 95 The Commentary notes that a position of
trust is "characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e.,
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable
deference)." 19 In applying the provision, the Eleventh Circuit explained
that the Guidelines contemplate those positions in which the victim
entrusts a defendant with discretion.197
While discretion seems to be a critical factor in a relationship or
position of trust, it is a concept that sentencing courts do not seem able to
define precisely. Thus, because both an investment advisor and the co-
partners of a general partnership are entrusted with a high degree of
discretion, some courts consider such reliance to involve greater trust.1
98
192. United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000); accord United States v.
Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that "the abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has
abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim"); United States v.
Garrison, 133 F.3d 831,840 (11th Cir. 1998).
193. See, e.g., Tribble, 206 F.3d at 637; Reccko, 151 F.3d at 31.
194. Ragland, 72 F.3d at 503; accord Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 n.18 (describing the
Sixth Circuit's opinion on this issue as "relevant clarification").
195. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (2001).
196. Id.
197. See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 840 (citing Second Circuit cases with approval).
19& See, e.g., United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1289 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Virtually
by definition, a money manager or financial adviser who is entrusted with, and who
proceeds fully to exercise, broad discretionary power in respect to other peoples' money
occupies a position of private trust.").
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For example, one court described a relationship of trust as one in which
the defendant occupies a position of influence over his victims that
exceeds mere reliance on someone's business expertise.1'9 This appears
to capture the nature of the relationship between an investment advisor
and her client as well as that between a lawyer and her client. However,
defining discretion is not an easy endeavor. In fact, courts that have
adopted this formulation tend to rely on comparisons to fiduciary law. °
Thus, instead of more concretely defining the meaning of discretion, one
court stated, without analysis, that the defendant must occupy a position
"vis-a-vis the victim that is in the nature of a fiduciary relationship. '"2 1
The court failed to discuss which theory of fiduciary law sentencing
judges should adopt in their application of the Guidelines."" More
importantly, because fiduciary law has failed to produce a consistent
theory for identifying trust relationships, this rather incomplete
comparison to fiduciary law may only inject greater confusion in the
process.
Additionally, courts that apply this theory could be subject to the same
criticism leveled at those who adopt the difficult-to-detect rationale
because these courts also tend to overemphasize the amount of
supervision that the victim exercised. Thus, one court explained
discretion as the lack of close supervision over the defendant's actions."0
Similarly, the First Circuit noted that a defendant who served as a
switchboard operator at a police headquarters and tipped a drug dealer
about an impending search did not occupy a position of trust because her
position reposed no discernible discretion."" Though the court claimed
to reject placing emphasis on an employee's freedom to commit
wrongs, the First Circuit explained that the defendant's lack of
discretion was evidenced by the fact that she was closely supervised and
used telephone lines that were regularly monitored.2 6 Similarly, the
Second Circuit noted that the fact that a victim could not engage in direct
monitoring of the defendant's conduct illustrated the defendant's
199. See Jolly, 102 F.3d at 49.
200. See, e.g., id. at 48-9.
201. Id. at 48.
202. See id.
203. See United States v. Akinyoke, 185 F.3d 192, 204 (4th Cir. 1999).
204. See United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29,32 (1st Cir. 1998).
205. See id. at 32-3 (noting that the proper inquiry with respect to a position of trust
was the degree of discretion a position afforded a victim, not the extent to which the
employee had the ability to commit wrongs that "defy facile detection").
206. See id.
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discretion.2W Because the discretion rationale also relies on the extent to
which an outside party has supervised a defendant, it may be of limited
analytical value.
Finally, while participants in many trust relationships have some
discretion over others within the relationship, there are instances where a
defendant may not be afforded a high degree of discretion yet still be
considered to occupy a position of trust.209 Thus, federal courts have
noted that some defendants, although they are closely supervised and
lack the ability to exercise discretion, may occupy a position of trust
worthy of the sentencing enhancement because of their unique access to
information. 2°9  A focus on discretion alone would exclude these
defendants.
This discussion reveals that federal courts differ on the qualities that
identify a trust relationship meriting sentencing enhancement. The
theories adopted by individual federal courts conflict with one another,
potentially producing differing results. For example, while the Seventh
Circuit's "access and authority" rationale may exclude an investment
advisor or lawyer from the definition of a relationship of trust, the
discretion rationale relied on by other courts may not. This discussion
further reveals the limits of all of the theories adopted by each of the
federal courts. Like the theories considered in connection with fiduciary
law, the theories adopted by federal sentencing courts may apply with
varying degrees of force depending on the relationship at issue. This
problem contributes to the confusion surrounding the application of the
abuse of trust provision.
V. TOWARD A RECONCILIATION
The Guidelines have attempted to explicate the insight that
people who violate a trust placed in them often do more
damage to the social fabric and are more culpable than those
who steal outright. That insight was no doubt universally
207. See United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that corporate
managers have discretionary control over corporate assets because public shareholders
cannot directly monitor their conduct and hence such managers occupy positions of trust).
208. See, e.g., Reccko, 151 F.3d at 32-3.
209. See id. at 33 (noting that while there may be sound arguments for holding such a
person accountable for violating a trust relationship, the language of the Guidelines
prevented such a conclusion).
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grasped by sentencing judges before the Guidelines were even
contemplated. However, it has been limited and somewhat
obfuscated by the Guidelines themselves.10
As this statement and the previous sections reveal, there has been
much confusion and frustration on the part of judges interpreting the• • 211
abuse of trust provision. Moreover, the Commission's instructions and
responses have been less than enlightening.
This experience mirrors that of fiduciary law. Commentators and
judges alike have found it very difficult to agree on the characteristics
that define a fiduciary relationship except in the most general of terms.12
This lack of consensus exists even though such relationships have
occupied Anglo-American law and jurisprudence for more than 250
213years.
Experiences with fiduciary law suggest that any principle for defining a
trust relationship must begin with the premise that the concept of trust
cannot be precisely defined. 214 Any solution also should acknowledge
that the determination of a trust relationship depends on the facts of
each case. As Professor DeMott has stated:
Although one can identify common core principles of fiduciary
obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force in
different contexts involving different types of parties and
relationships. Recognition that the law of fiduciary obligation is
situation-specific should be the starting point for any further
analysis.1 5
This recognition counsels against the creation of definitive rules or
examples. Thus, the Commission first should clarify that the term
"position" includes relationships that are characterized by trust. This will
minimize any arbitrary distinctions between those who violate trust
conferred upon them in their capacity as an office holder and those who
do so in some non-official role. Such a clarification will also focus courts
on identifying those qualities that truly reveal relationships of high trust.
More importantly, the bank teller exclusion, together with other
potentially confusing specific examples, should be eliminated from the
Commentary. Part III.B. of this Article illustrates that specific examples,
210. United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting).
211. See supra Part IV.
212. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15, at 1045.
213. See id.
214. See Scallen, supra note 46, at 902 (noting that any principle must be based on "the
understanding that no definition of fiduciary relationships can remain static").
215. DeMott, supra note 10, at 879.
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such as the bank teller exclusion, have hindered, rather than helped, the
application of the abuse of trust provision.21' First, such examples cause
sentencing courts to resort to analogies in seeking to pinpoint a
relationship of trust. However, fiduciary law underscores the notion that
analogies provide relatively little instruction for those seeking to identify
the qualities constituting a trust relationship. 21 1 Indeed, the variety of
settings in which a fiduciary relationship can arise makes it difficult to
analogize those relationships except in a general way.218 Hence, the
Commission's examples, though seemingly helpful, can undermine
attempts to identify a position of trust. Second, generating specific
examples leads to confusion. As fiduciary law reveals, trust relationships
"resist[] tidy categorization. 2 9 For example, the qualities inherent in
one bank teller's relationship with her victims are not necessarily
indicative of those with other relatively low-level jobs. The fiduciary law
recognition that trust relationships tend to be situation-specific suggests
the probable ineffectiveness of precise examples as a guide for
determining whether relationships involve the level of trust that warrants
a sentence enhancement.
Based on this assessment, the Guidelines should avoid identifying
specific examples of a trust relationship altogether; instead, they should
adopt a general statement of purpose and a broad list of relevant criteria.
The Commentary should provide sentencing judges with a list of non-
exhaustive factors to which courts may refer when determining what
constitutes a relationship of trust. These factors should include
characteristics from all theories currently being employed. In generating
this list, the Commission should acknowledge that any inquiry related to
a position of trust will be fact-specific and that the list may apply with
varying degrees of force depending on the relationships and transactions
at issue. Because this solution offers only a suggestive list, sentencing
judges will need to determine the extent to which the given factors within
the list apply to a particular situation.
Given the lessons learned from fiduciary law, these changes may
represent a more practical solution to the problem that the abuse of trust
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 879-80.
219. See id. at 879.
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provision presents. Indeed, such changes account for the fluidity
necessary for applying fiduciary law concepts and other ideas related to
trust relationships more generally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to impose a sentencing enhancement based on trust must
begin with what scholars of fiduciary relationships have long recognized
- namely, that trust is a concept that varies by context and is very
difficult to define except in the most general of terms. This Article
reveals that, like courts and commentators seeking to define the contours
of fiduciary law, sentencing judges have struggled to understand and
apply accurately the Guidelines' abuse of trust provision. The circuit
courts have developed a variety of different theories aimed at
accomplishing this endeavor. These theories result in confusion and
some degree of conflict among the circuits about the qualities underlying
a relationship of trust. They also reflect a failure to appreciate the
lessons learned from fiduciary law regarding the inherent vagueness in
the concept of trust.
In light of these problems, the Commission needs to take action and
provide some clarity on the issue. Ironically, fiduciary law reveals that
the Commission could provide more guidance by rejecting precision in
favor of broader instructions in this area. Thus, instead of focusing on
greater precision, the Guidelines should be modified to eliminate specific
examples in favor of a general statement of purpose and a non-
exhaustive list of factors to which judges may refer when determining the
existence of a position of trust. This approach may be inconsistent with
Congress' goal of providing more predictability and less judicial
discretion for federal sentencing" 2 However, a simple review of the
cases related to the Guidelines' abuse of trust provision reveals that such
a goal is illusive at best. A comparison with fiduciary law underscores
and confirms this observation.
220. Congress enacted the Guidelines to increase uniformity and predictability in the
sentencing process and to reduce the discretion of federal sentencing judges, which
contributed to sentencing disparities. See, e.g., Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of
Federal Sentencing. Beyond the Criticism, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 1574, 1574-1575 (1997); Frank
0. Bowman, Ill, The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning
to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 690 (noting that
Congress set out to create guidelines that would make sentencing more predictable and
less discretionary); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial
Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 107 (1994)
(noting that the Guidelines grew out of sentencing reform measures aimed at limiting
judicial discretion).
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